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Zoning and Land Use Law
by Newton M. Galloway*
and Steven L. Jones**
I. INTRODUCTION
With the close of the survey period for the seventy-first (71st) volume
of the Mercer Law Review, development throughout the State of
Georgia continued to thrive. While traditional brick-and-mortar
commercial development is evolving, residential and industrial
development remains steady. As a result, zoning challenges continued
to present issues for resolution by Georgia’s appellate courts. This
Article identifies important zoning and land use decisions of the
Georgia Supreme Court (supreme court) and Georgia Court of Appeals
(court of appeals) issued between June 1, 2018 and May 31, 2019. 1

*Partner, Galloway & Lyndall, LLP. Mercer University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University
School of Law (J.D., 1981); Member, Mercer Law Review (1979–1981). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
**Associate, Bovis, Kyle, Burch & Medlin LLC. University of Georgia (B.B.A., 2012);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (2014–2016).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of zoning and land use law during the prior survey period, see
Newton M. Galloway & Steven L. Jones, Zoning and Land Use Law, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 301 (2018). This Article does not address every
interesting or germane zoning decision rendered during the survey period. The following
cases are of note: The Quarters Decatur, LLC v. City of Decatur, 347 Ga. App. 723, 820
S.E.2d 741 (2018) (discussing when a property owner has “vested rights” under the
current ordinance and approvals to prevent subsequent ordinance amendments from
affecting the rights of the property owner); Morgan Cty. v. May, 305 Ga. 305, 824 S.E.2d
365 (2019) (invalidating an unconstitutionally vague zoning ordinance that, as applied,
did not afford “a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning that [short term rentals of
single family homes are] forbidden . . . sufficient specificity so as not to encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”); Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 348 Ga. App. 216,
820 S.E.2d 257 (2018) (an interesting annexation case cabined to the facts of the case);
Fulton Cty. v. City of Atlanta, 305 Ga. 342, 825 S.E.2d 142 (2019) (same). This Article also
does not review cases involving condemnation, nuisance, trespass, easement, or
restrictive covenants.
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Generally, the decisions by Georgia’s appellate courts in zoning
related cases continued the transformation of legislative “zoning
decisions” defined by Georgia’s Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL) 2 into
quasi-judicial, administrative actions, imposing greater procedural and
evidentiary requirements for zoning hearings and superior court
appeals. However, with respect to quasi-judicial zoning decisions, the
appellate courts applied the “any evidence” rule to give greater weight
to lay witness opponents and greater deference to local governments. As
discussed herein, these simultaneous trends are contradictory and
problematic because zoning hearings have never been conducted in a
manner comparable to administrative law proceedings. As a result,
notable cases decided during the survey period were delivered by
splintered divisions of the court of appeals, resulting in only physical
precedents.3 To begin, this Article addresses important legislative
developments related to the application of sovereign immunity to
actions brought against local government officials in zoning decisions.
II. APPEALS TO SUPERIOR COURT
A. Sovereign Immunity: Lathrop v. Deal, HB 311 and Governor Kemp’s
Veto
In Lathrop v. Deal (discussed in last year’s survey),4 a super majority
of the Georgia Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity extends to
constitutionally-based claims barring all causes of action against the
state “including suits for injunctive and declaratory relief from the
enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws” and bars actions
against local government officials acting within the authority of their
official capacities.5 Applied to a zoning case, the rule from Lathrop bars
actions against city and county officials acting within the authority of
their official positions, but it allows a claim to proceed against officials
in their individual capacities. 6
The supreme court in Lathrop reiterated that sovereign immunity
may only be waived by the legislature or constitutional amendment. 7
So, the legislature responded in 2019 when both chambers of the
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1–36-66-6 (2019).
3. GA. CT. APP. R. 33.2(a). An opinion of the court is binding precedent if all three
judges on the panel fully concur. An opinion is physical precedent (though citable as
persuasive) if there is a dissent.
4. 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017).
5. Id. at 444, 801 S.E.2d at 892.
6. See id. at 422, 434, 801 S.E.2d at 877, 885; see also GA. CONST art. IX, § 2, para. 9.
7. Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 419, 801 S.E.2d at 876.
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Georgia General Assembly passed House Bill 311 8 with zero “Nay”
votes.9 HB 311 approved a waiver of sovereign immunity for any claim
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief in an action against a state or
local government official or employee, in their official capacity,
challenging enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute or an
unconstitutional or illegal local government ordinance or action. 10
HB 311’s waiver of sovereign immunity was strictly limited to claims
such as those raised in Lathrop and which are typically asserted in a
zoning case against county commissioners or municipal council
members alleging that a zoning ordinance or decision violates the
applicant(s)’s or owner(s)’s constitutional rights. Above all, HB 311
granted Georgia citizens the ability to address unconstitutional laws by
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state and local
government officials in their official capacities. 11 But, Governor Kemp
vetoed HB 311; therefore, without a sovereign immunity waiver from
the General Assembly, the issues unresolved after the decision in
Lathrop continue.12
B. Expansion of City of Cumming v. Flowers: York v. Athens College of
Ministry, Inc.
In City of Cumming v. Flowers,13 the Georgia Supreme Court held
that (regardless of the appeal method prescribed in the local
government’s zoning ordinance) a “quasi-judicial” decision by a local
government official, board, or governing authority must be appealed by
writ of certiorari to the superior court.14 A variance was at issue in
Flowers, but dicta therein suggested that the supreme court might
apply its holding to an appeal of a decision involving “special approval,”
known also as a special exception, special permit, special use permit, or
conditional use (collectively, SUP). 15 The court of appeals applied the
holding of Flowers in York v. Athens College of Ministry, Inc.16

8. Ga. H.R. Bill 311, Reg. Sess. (2019) (unenacted). HB 311 was authored by
Representative Welch (R. McDonough) and sponsored by Senator Kennedy (R. Macon).
Both legislators are attorneys.
9. Ga.
H.R.
Bill
311,
Reg.
Sess.
(2019),
available
at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20192020/HB/311.
10. Id. §§ 1-1–2-1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846 (2017).
14. Id. at 833, 797 S.E.2d at 857.
15. Id. at 827 n.5, 797 S.E.2d at 853 n.5.
16. 348 Ga. App. 58, 821 S.E.2d 120 (2018).
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A SUP allows land uses that are not permitted within a zoning
district as a matter of right but may be compatible with permitted uses
allowed in the zoning district at a specific location. 17 In other words,
“the ordinance provides that [the SUP] shall be allowed only upon the
condition that it be approved by the appropriate governmental body”
pursuant to analysis of approval criteria set out in the ordinance. 18 ZPL
specifically identifies “[t]he grant of a permit relating to a special use of
property”—in other words, approval of a SUP—as a “final legislative”
zoning decision.19
The distinction between a legislative local government decision and a
quasi-judicial decision is critically important. A legislative decision is a
“general inquiry” not bound to specific circumstances, facts, people, or
property; rather, it “‘results in a rule of law or course of policy that will
apply in the future.’”20 An appeal of a legislative zoning decision is
direct, and the standard of review is de novo.21 Therefore, the petitioner
(usually, the zoning applicant whose request was denied) may introduce
new evidence, including expert testimony, arguments, and issues to the
superior court that were not presented in the zoning hearing below. 22
In contrast, a quasi-judicial decision applies facts to criteria set forth
in black-letter law and results in the establishment of rights and
obligations or resolves specific disputes. 23 A quasi-judicial decision “‘is
tightly controlled by the ordinance.’”24 A quasi-judicial decision is
appealed by writ of certiorari from a decision of an inferior tribunal (in
zoning cases, usually the local governing body), and the superior court
sits as an appellate judiciary.25 The “any evidence” standard applies,
limiting the superior court’s review to the facts, evidence, and issues
raised before the local governmental body or official.26

17. Id. at 62, 821 S.E.2d at 125.
18. City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving & Storage Co., 245 Ga. 794, 794, 267 S.E.2d
234, 235 (1980), overruled in part by Flowers, 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846.
19. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(e) (2019).
20. York, 348 Ga. App. at 60, 821 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting Diversified Holdings, LLP, v.
City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597, 601–02, 807 S.E.2d 876, 882 (2017)).
21. Stendahl v. Cobb Cty., 284 Ga. 525, 526, 668 S.E.2d 723, 726 (2008).
22. Id. at 527, 668 S.E.2d at 726.
23. York, 348 Ga. App. at 60, 821 S.E.2d at 123.
24. RCG Properties, LLC. v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustments, 260 Ga. App.
355, 361, 579 S.E.2d 782, 787 (2003) (a SUP case) (quoting LaFave v. City of Atlanta, 258
Ga. 631, 632, 373 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2003) (a variance case)).
25. City of Dunwoody v. Discovery Practice Mgmt., Inc., 338 Ga. App. 135, 138, 789
S.E.2d 386, 389 (2016). “The substantial-evidence standard [under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-12(b)] is
effectively the same as the any-evidence standard.” Id.
26. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-12(b) (2019); York, 348 Ga. App. at 63, 821 S.E.2d at 125.
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Adoption of a zoning ordinance and map have long been held to be
legislative.27 The rezoning of a specific parcel has also been deemed
legislative because approval of rezoning amends the zoning map, which
is part of the zoning ordinance.28 Decisions on variances, plat approval
(preliminary and final), and approval of building and construction
permits have historically been deemed quasi-judicial because they do
not amend the local government’s zoning ordinance.29
Before 1998, SUPs were not included within the definition of a
“zoning decision” under ZPL and considered pursuant to a process that
was like a variance—more quasi-judicial than legislative, to which the
“any evidence” standard applied.30 In 1998, ZPL was amended and
redefined “zoning decision” to include SUPs, as follows:
[F]inal legislative action by a local government which results in:
(A) The adoption of a zoning ordinance;
(B) The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which
changes the text of the zoning ordinance;
(C) The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which
rezones property from one zoning classification to another;

27. See City Council of Augusta v. Irvin, 109 Ga. App. 598, 600, 137 S.E.2d 82, 84
(1964).
28. Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 265, 219 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1975).
29. See Flowers, 300 Ga. App. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848; RCG Properties, LLC, 260
Ga. App. at 361, 579 S.E.2d at 787; Emory Univ. v. Levitas, 260 Ga. 894, 896–97, 401
S.E.2d 691, 694 (1991).
This Court has never set forth the standard of review to be applied by a
superior court in reviewing whether the evidence presented to a local
administrative agency or local governing body supports the grant or denial of a
variance. We now hold that the any-evidence standard is the appropriate
standard of review.
Emory Univ., 260 Ga. at 896—97.
30. E.g., Ga. H.R. Bill 489, Reg. Sess., 1997 Ga. Laws 1567, § 2 (codified at O.C.G.A.
tit. 36 (1997)); e.g., Dougherty Cty. v. Webb, 256 Ga. 474, 477 n.3, 350 S.E.2d 457, 460 n.3
(1986), overruled in part by Flowers, 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846.
[W]here a [SUP] is sought under terms set out in the ordinance . . . the
landowner must present his case on its facts and the law to the local governing
body. That body acts in a quasi-judicial capacity to determine the facts and
apply the law . . . [On appeal, the] superior court is bound by the facts
presented to the local governing body. The law, of course, is determined anew
by the superior court.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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(D) The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance by a
municipal local government which zones property to be annexed into
the municipality; or
(E) The grant of a permit relating to a special use of property.31

In fact, the amicus curiae brief in York pointed out that the 1998
amendment to ZPL classified special exceptions as legislative, and ZPL
makes it clear that approval of a SUP is a “final legislative action.” 32
After 1998, cases continued to treat SUP decisions as quasi-judicial.33
Georgia’s appellate courts, however, did not attempt to reconcile ZPL
until the decision in York.
In York, Athens College of Ministry, Inc. (ACM) applied for a SUP to
build a 100 plus acre collegiate seminary. The local government
approved it with conditions. Prior to the decision, neighborhood
opponents (the opponents) who objected, by letter, to the approval of the
SUP, appealed to superior court by writ of certiorari. In the Oconee
County Superior Court, ACM and the local government objected to the
opponents standing to challenge SUP approval for the first time. 34
A majority of the panel held that granting the SUP was a
quasi-judicial decision because the local government was required to
apply criteria of approval for the SUP set out in the zoning ordinance. 35
Because approval of ACM’s SUP was quasi-judicial, the superior court’s
review was limited to the “any evidence” standard.36 Below, neither

31. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4) (2019).
32. York, 348 Ga. App. at 62 n.7, 821 S.E.2d at 124 n.7 (citing 1998 Ga. Laws 1391,
§ 1); Joseph A. All, Local Government: Zoning Procedures: Change Definition of Zoning
Decision to Include Grant of Special Use Permits, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 194, 194–95
(1998).
33. Gwinnett Cty. v. Ehler Enters., 270 Ga. 570, 570, 512 S.E.2d 239, 240–41 (1999)
(relying on the decision in Emory Univ. to apply “any evidence” to a SUP, a ZPL zoning
decision); Fulton Cty. v. Congregation of Anshei Chesed, 275 Ga. 856, 859–60, 572 S.E.2d
530, 532 (2002) (same, relying on Gwinnett County); Jackson Cty. v. Earth Resources, Inc.
280 Ga. 389, 391, 627 S.E.2d 569, 571 (2006) (same, relying on Fulton County); City of
Roswell v. Fellowship Christian Sch., Inc., 281 Ga. 767, 768, 642 S.E.2d 824, 825 (2007)
(same, relying on Fulton County and Gwinnett County); Stendahl, 284 Ga. at 527, 668
S.E.2d at 726 (distinguishing City of Roswell and Jackson County as involving SUPs, not
rezonings); Bulloch Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Williams, 332 Ga. App. 815, 815, 773 S.E.2d
37, 38 (2015) (applying the “any evidence” standard to a SUP and relying on Jackson
County).
34. York, 348 Ga. App at 58–59, 821 S.E.2d at 122.
35. Id. at 64, 821 S.E.2d at 125; see also Flowers, 300 Ga. at 823–24, 797 S.E.2d at
850–51.
36. York, 348 Ga. App. at 59–60, 821 S.E.2d at 123 (“When a party seeks certiorari
review in the trial court of a decision of an administrative body acting in a quasi-judicial
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ACM nor the local government challenged the opponents’ standing
when confronted with their letter of opposition. 37 Having failed to
challenge the opponents’ standing below, ACM and the County could
not challenge the opponents’ standing for the first time on appeal. 38
Though York involved a standing challenge, its rationale (if expanded)
also requires substantive issues to be raised, and evidence to be
presented thereon to the local government during the zoning hearing or
to be precluded from consideration on appeal by the superior court. 39
The majority in York gave no credence to the ordinance’s
characterization of the decision because “‘substance matters far more
than form, and the courts need not capitulate to the label that a
government body places on its action.’” 40 To determine whether a local
government decision was legislative or quasi-judicial, the majority in
York required the superior court to consider the parameters and
requirements of the decision codified in the local government’s zoning
ordinance and the process the local governing authority used to reach
it.41
The majority in York attempted to reconcile its decision with ZPL’s
classification of a SUP as a “final legislative” act. 42 To circumvent
Section 3(4) of ZPL, the majority noted that ZPL “defines a ‘zoning
decision,’ not a [SUP] or ‘special use approval decision.’” 43 Therefore,
ZPL’s definition “does not, on its face, make a local government’s
issuance of any and all ‘permit[s] related to a special use of property’
‘legislative action[s],’ regardless of the process that was used to make
any such decision.”44 The court insisted that this was the proper
textualist interpretation, irrespective of ZPL’s plain text. 45 Under the
majority’s opinion in York, any local government decision which

capacity, the trial court is bound by the facts and evidence presented to the
administrative body . . . .”).
37. Id. at 64, 821 S.E.2d at 126.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 62 n.6, 821 S.E.2d at 124 n.6 (quoting State of Ga. v. Int’l Keystone Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 402, 799 S.E.2d 455, 463 (2016)).
41. Id. at 62, 821 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting Flowers, 300 Ga. at 831, 797 S.E.2d at 855).
42. Id. at 62–63, 821 S.E.2d at 124–25.
43. Id. at 62, 821 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)).
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172, 751 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2013). “When
we consider the meaning of a statute, ‘we must presume that the General Assembly
meant what it said and said what it meant.’”). Id.
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requires the application and review of criteria set forth by statute or
ordinance is quasi-judicial.46
The tests presented by Flowers and York are clear: to determine
whether a decision is quasi-judicial or legislative, the court must
disregard nomenclature (and the clarity of ZPL) and instead analyze
the ordinance’s standards and procedure for the decision. In a footnote,
the majority in York reasoned, as follows:
Although Flowers concerned a variance, and this case involves a
[SUP], the Supreme Court in Flowers noted that they are similar.
The Supreme Court then stated, “it is not clear that [SUPs] are
meaningfully different from variances cases . . . at least in cases
where the zoning board must apply a set of factors set out in the
zoning ordinance to the specific facts of the [SUP application].” . . .
[S]ince the decision-making process in Flowers is similar to the
process used here [for an SUP], we find that Flowers is applicable.47

This reasoning may be sound in the context of a variance (which is
not a “zoning decision” under ZPL and was at issue in Flowers) and
non-zoning contexts such as licensing.48 But, it creates inherent conflict
when applied to other “zoning decisions” identified as legislative acts
under ZPL.
Judge Goss’s dissent in York distinguishes Flowers based on a
textual interpretation of the ZPL, noting a distinction between a SUP
that involves the change in use of land to “a change ‘potentially
incompatible with uses allowed in the particular zoning district’” and a
SUP that does not involve the change in use of the real estate at
issue49—a distinction previously made by Judge Branch in Druid Hills
Civic Association v. Buckler,50 which relies on RCG Properties, LLC v.
City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustments.51 The majority dismissed
this distinction because “Buckler neither held nor implied that all [SUP]
decisions are legislative, and [the court] will not read it as such.” 52 But,

46. Id. at 63, 821 S.E.2d at 125.
47. Id. at 61 n.5, 821 S.E.2d at 124 n.5 (internal citation omitted).
48. See Rogers v. City of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 121–22, 137 S.E.2d 668, 674
(1964) (cited by the majority in York) (“A governmental agency entrusted with the
licensing power . . . functions as a legislature when it prescribes standards, but the same
agency acts as a judicial body when it makes a determination that a specific applicant has
or has not satisfied them.”).
49. York, 348 Ga. App. at 64, 821 S.E.2d at 126 (quoting Druid Hills Civic Ass’n v.
Buckler, 328 Ga. App. 485, 493, 760 S.E.2d 194, 201 (2014)) (Goss, J., dissenting).
50. 328 Ga. App. 485, 760 S.E.2d 194.
51. 260 Ga. App. 355, 579 S.E.2d 782 (2003).
52. York, 348 Ga. App. at 63 n.9, 821 S.E.2d at 125 n.9.
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the majority and dissent in York failed to recognize that Druid Hills
Civic Association and RCG Properties, LLC involved re-platting
residential lots on a development plat and a request for a “special
administrative permit,” respectively—neither of which has ever been a
zoning decision under ZPL. 53 Neither case adequately deals with the
conflict between ZPL and the majority opinion in York.
Looking forward, the next step in the transformation of zoning
decisions to quasi-judicial decisions will involve a challenge to denial or
approval of a rezoning application. The majority’s holding in York is
unworkable when applied to rezoning applications and the practical
reality of how zoning hearings are conducted. Although rezoning
decisions are unequivocally legislative “zoning decisions” under ZPL,
they require consideration of factors set forth in an ordinance. In fact,
ZPL requires that a local government’s zoning ordinance include,
“standards governing the exercise of the [constitutionally delegated
legislative] zoning power [which] . . . may include any factors . . . the
local government finds relevant in balancing the interest in promoting
the public health, safety, morality, or general welfare against the right
to the unrestricted use of property.”54 Likewise, in Guhl v. Holcomb
Bridge Road Corp.,55 the supreme court established the following
factors courts must consider to determine whether the current zoning
district applied to property is constitutional:
“(1) existing uses and zoning of nearby property;
(2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the
particular zoning restrictions;
(3) the extent to which the destruction of property values of the
plaintiffs promotes the health, safety, morals or general welfare of
the public;
(4) the relative gain to the public, as compared to the hardship
imposed upon the individual property owner;
(5) the suitability of the subject property for the zoned purposes; and

53. Druid Hills Civic Ass’n, 328 Ga. App. at 485–86, 760 S.E.2d at 196; RCG Props.,
LLC, 260 Ga. App. at 355, 579 S.E.2d at 783.
54. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5(b) (2019). ZPL also requires that local governments “adopt
policies and procedures which govern calling and conducting hearings required by [ZPL
Section 4].” O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5(a) (2019).
55. 238 Ga. 322, 232 S.E.2d 830 (1977).
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(6) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned,
considered in the context of land development in the area in the
vicinity of the property.”56

Guhl’s requirements are established precedent. Analysis of a
rezoning application under the Guhl factors (and its progeny) is
required when a local government’s decision on a rezoning application
is appealed to superior court.57
Therefore, every zoning decision involving a rezoning of property
requires analysis of the rezoning request pursuant to criteria
established legislatively by a zoning ordinance (as required by statute)
and Guhl. This analysis determines whether a local government acted
in a constitutional manner in either approving or denying rezoning.
Application of these authorities affords property owners the assurance
that a local government cannot act arbitrarily in applying a zoning
classification to their property. Yet, the majority opinion in York will
transform legislative rezoning decisions into quasi-judicial acts. If a
rezoning decision on a particular tract is deemed quasi-judicial, Flowers
and York will rewrite the list of “zoning decisions” defined by ZPL,
leaving the adoption of a zoning ordinance as the only legislative
decision.
As a practical matter, the transformation of legislative zoning
hearings into quasi-judicial proceedings is neither workable nor fair to
the applicant and the public. ZPL aside, the decisions in Flowers and
York represent successive (and logical) steps if the goal is to transform
informal, legislative style hearings on zoning decisions into more
formal, administrative proceedings and give superior courts the
responsibilities of appellate courts. But zoning hearings do not fit well
into a formal, administrative hearing model.
After the decision in York, zoning practitioners, local governments,
zoning applicants, and zoning opponents must prepare and preserve a
legal, evidentiary record below, even if the likelihood of appeal is
remote. Preservation of the record before the local government may
require hearing transcription by a court reporter,58 proffering,

56. Id. at 323–24, 232 S.E.2d at 831–32 (quoting La Salle Nat’l Bank v. Cty. of Cook,
208 N.E.2d 430, 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)).
57. E.g., Diversified Holdings, LLP, 302 Ga. at 608–09, 612, 807 S.E.2d at 887, 889.
58. Despite the existence of a transcript of the hearing, the minutes of the local
governing body remain the official record of its actions. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(a)(1)(B),
(e)(2)(b) (2019); see also O.C.G.A. § 36-1-25 (2019); Garner v. Young, 214 Ga. 109, 111, 103
S.E.2d 302, 304 (1958) (“[T]he highest and best evidence of official action taken by [a local
government is] . . . the original minutes or exemplified copies of the action taken by it.”).
Id.
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swearing, and examining expert witnesses, and pre-filing written
objections. Time limitations imposed by the local government may
impair the ability of both applicants and opponents to present their
cases in a manner capable of preserving a solid record. ZPL only
requires a local government give ten minutes per side at a zoning
hearing.59 Time limits can be onerous on the ability of applicants and
opponents to present or oppose a zoning case, especially if either the
local government’s planning staff or recommending body do not make
recommendations favorable to an applicant’s or opponent’s position.
Therefore, written or verbal objections must be made by (1) a local
government to challenge deficiencies in the presentation of the rezoning
applicant or the opponents thereof sufficient to give a “reasonable mind”
evidence to justify the decision under the “any evidence” standard, (2)
the applicant to support approval, negate public objection and, as
applicable, support or refute staff and/or the recommending body, and
(3) public opponents to justify denial or mitigating conditions.
Otherwise, those objections are deemed waived under the “any
evidence” rule on appeal to the superior court.
At a minimum, written objections of an applicant should include
objections to the following: any time limitation for presentation and
argument imposed on the applicant, the standing of public opponents
and the lay, testimony and evidence presented by them, any evidence or
testimony presented, or decision made upon grounds other than the
local ordinance standards required by O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5, any decision
that does not follow the recommendations of the local government’s
planning staff or recommending body to the extent favorable, and (as a
catch all) grounds for reversal similar to those set out in O.C.G.A.
§ 50-13-19(h)60 for decision of administrative agencies.
59. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5(a) (2019).
60. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (2019) provides as follows:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may
reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Id.
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Applicants and opponents to rezoning applications usually appear
pro se at zoning hearings, which are usually conducted without the
procedural and evidentiary formalities required of most quasi-judicial
proceedings. As a result, the parties are not aware of the risks
presented by the proceedings’ quasi-judicial designation. Zoning
hearings that must follow an administrative hearing format will require
(if done properly) much more time and significant, costly preparation,
giving lawyers the opportunity for a new revenue source.
By its own terms, the majority opinion in York is only physical
precedent.61 However, it may be followed by a future case that
challenges a rezoning decision, as the next step in the transition of
legislative zoning decisions into quasi-judicial actions. Whatever is
done, the courts “must presume that the General Assembly meant what
it said and said what it meant.”62
C. A Public Hearing Before a Recommending Body May Satisfy ZPL’s
Public Hearing Requirement.
In Hoechstetter v. Pickens County,63 a unanimous supreme court
indicated that an “adequate” record of a hearing before a recommending
body—such as a planning commission—”perhaps might satisfy the
[hearing] requirements of ZPL.”64 In Hoechstetter, property owners
sought a SUP from the local governing authority. The planning
commission held a hearing at which multiple neighbors spoke against
the SUP. Regardless, the application received an approval
recommendation.65
A month later, Pickens County’s director of public relations prepared
a one-page memorandum conveying the recommendation, stating that
the planning commission heard “testimony from the applicant and
considerable objections from the surrounding neighborhood in
attendance,” but it did not state the opponents’ substantive objections. 66
The County’s board of commissioners approved the SUP based on the
approval recommendation, without conducting another hearing
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4. The neighborhood opponents appealed,

61. York, 348 Ga. App. at 64, 821 S.E.2d at 126.
62. Deal, 294 Ga. at 172, 751 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae,
292 Ga. 243, 245, 734 S.E.2d 55, 57 (2012)).
63. 303 Ga. 786, 815 S.E.2d 50 (2018).
64. Id. at 788, 815 S.E.2d at 52.
65. Id. at 787, 815 S.E.2d at 51.
66. Id. at 788, 815 S.E.2d at 52.
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alleging insufficient opportunity to be heard by the governing
authority.67
The supreme court agreed, finding the record, if any, transmitted to
the governing authority did not satisfy ZPL. 68 The court noted that an
adequate record need not be a “contemporaneous and verbatim
transcript of the hearing” before the recommending body, but it must be
more “fulsome than the one in” Hoechstetter.69 Since the board of
commissioners of the county, as the local governing authority, exercises
zoning authority,70 ZPL’s hearing requirement was presumed by
practitioners to apply to the board of commissioners. Local governments
cannot delegate their zoning power.71 There is no legal requirement
that any local government create a recommending body. Many do so to
flesh out information on the development proposed in an application in
advance of the hearing before the governing authority. Plainly, the
prevailing (and best) practice is to hold a public hearing before both the
recommending body as well as the governing authority.
Reading York and Hoechstetter together causes concern. On one
hand, the majority in York continues the transition of zoning hearings
into quasi-judicial administrative proceedings that are more detailed
than those currently conducted by most jurisdictions. On the other
hand, Hoechstetter can be read to allow the governing body of the local
government to defer the hearing required by ZPL to a recommending
body before which (presumably) the required legal and evidentiary
record for a quasi-judicial hearing would be presented. Does
Hoechstetter, however, suggest that the governing body can delegate the
obligation to conduct a quasi-judicial hearing to a recommending body,
as a surrogate? If so, the legal and evidentiary requirements for a
quasi-judicial hearing must be satisfied before the surrogate body.
D. Evidentiary Sufficiency of Public Opposition: Macon-Bibb County
Planning & Zoning Comm’n v. Epic Midstream, LLC
Generally, public opposition is insufficient to defeat a rezoning or
SUP application if the opponents assert only generalized fears about
traffic, noise, or other development impacts.72 Public grandstanding
about speculative impacts resulting from a proposed development
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
(1988).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 788 n.3, 815 S.E.2d at 52 n.3.
GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4.
Humthlett v. Reeves, 212 Ga. 8, 12–13, 90 S.E.2d 14, 18 (1955).
E.g., Fulton Cty. v. Bartenfield, 257 Ga. 766, 770–71, 363 S.E.2d 555, 559–60
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should be given little credibility. However, the majority of a division of
the court of appeals in Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Commission v. Epic Midstream, LLC,73 found that public opposition to a
SUP was sufficient to support its denial because the opponents’
statements addressed “specific” issues, though the statements were not
factually substantiated.74
In Macon-Bibb County, Epic Midstream, LLC (Epic) acquired
property (the subject property) on which a previous owner operated a
rail-to-pipeline jet-fuel transfer station in conjunction with a jet-fuel
pipeline and easement therefor.75 The pipeline leaked prior to Epic’s
acquisition, and even after transfer to Epic, the prior owner “retained
responsibility for the jet-fuel leak and its remediation.”76
After acquiring the subject property, Epic filed a rezoning application
to rezone a portion of the property to M-1, Wholesale and Light
Industrial District (consistent with the zoning applied to the rest of the
subject property) and a SUP application “to build and operate a railroad
spur transfer station for the offloading of ethanol from railroad tanker
cars directly into an underground pipeline [planned to be constructed in
the existing pipeline right of way] which would transport the ethanol to
Epic’s petroleum distribution facility nearby.” 77 Epic’s operation was
similar to that of the prior owner, though an entirely different fuel was
transported. Epic’s SUP application did not seek approval for the
ethanol pipeline, which was already approved by the Georgia
Department of Transportation and the Macon-Bibb Engineering
Department.78 “Thus, regardless of whether the [Macon-Bibb Planning
& Zoning Commission (the PZ Commission)] approved or denied the
[SUP], Epic could build the . . . pipeline . . . .”79

73. 349 Ga. App. 568, 826 S.E.2d 403 (2019) (hereinafter Macon-Bibb Cty.).
74. Id. at 575–76, 826 S.E.2d at 409.
75. Id. at 568–70, 826 S.E.2d at 404–05.
76. Id. at 570, 826 S.E.2d at 406.
77. Id. at 569, 826 S.E.2d at 405; MACON-BIBB COUNTY, GA., COMPREHENSIVE LAND
DEV. RESOLUTION, ch. 16 (1997) [hereinafter CLDR].
78. Macon-Bibb Cty., 349 Ga. App. at 569 n.2, 826 S.E.2d at 405 n.2.
79. Id. at 576, 826 S.E.2d at 409 (Brown, J., dissenting). Although the opinion is not
clear, a review of the Macon-Bibb County Comprehensive Land Development Resolution
(the CLDR) suggests that Epic Midstream sought a SUP for either or both a railroad
terminal and an “‘establishment for the manufacture, repair, assembly, or processing of
materials similar in nature to those listed in Section 16.03 [of the CLDR] which is not
objectionable by reason of smoke, dust, odor, bright lights, noise or vibration.’” CDLR
§ 16.03(4), (18).
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Both applications dovetailed for hearing before the PZ Commission. 80
Epic proffered significant expert and design testimony in support of the
applications. Its design manager testified as to the site layout. Its
project director testified as to the limited frequency—roughly once a
month—of the fuel transfers. Its expert land planner testified that the
rezoning and SUP applications sought development consistent with
most nearby properties currently zoned and used for industrial
operations.81 Additionally, “the land planner testified [in conclusion]
that the region in which the property is located is ‘largely industrial,’
that the property is within close proximity to five industrial parks, and
that the property is best suited to an industrial purpose.” 82 Since 1991,
no new residences were constructed in a small residential development
located between the northern boundary of the subject property and an
industrial park.83
Four opponents objected to Epic’s applications based on the leak of
the jet-fuel pipeline under prior ownership.84 The opponents, which
included a member of the Board of Commissioners (the Commissioner)
whose district included the subject property, opposed the applications,
stating that the residents “were suffering ‘environmental injustice’ and
still had no answers about the past jet-fuel pipeline leak.”85 The PZ
Commission approved the rezoning and denied the SUP application. 86
Epic filed a motion to rehear the SUP application along with a revised
site plan that moved the transfer facility further from the residential
neighborhood, and “included additional engineering and safety controls,
such as an earthen berm, . . . additional fire hydrants[,] and a security
fence.”87 Epic also met with the Commissioner.88
Roughly a month before the hearing, the Pipeline Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Railway
Administration designated ethanol as a “hazardous liquid” which “may
pose an unreasonable risk to life or property when transported by a

80. In Macon-Bibb County, the zoning authority rests with the PZ Commission by
virtue of a rare, local constitutional amendment carried forward by the 1983 Constitution.
1947 Ga. Laws 1240, § 1; 1986 Ga. Laws 5308; see also GA. CONST. art. XI, § 1, para. 4.
81. Macon-Bibb Cty., 349 Ga. App. at 569–70, 826 S.E.2d at 405.
82. Id. at 570, 826 S.E.2d at 405.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 570, 826 S.E.2d at 406.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 570–71, 826 S.E.2d at 406.
87. Id. at 571, 826 S.E.2d at 406.
88. Id.
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hazardous liquid pipeline facility in a liquid state.”89 With ethanol’s
designation as a hazardous liquid, the Commission’s Planning Staff
(Staff) revised its report on the applications to state that “hazardous
and flammable liquid . . . could pose a danger to the adjacent residents
in the event of a derailment, spill, or fire.”90 The staff concluded that the
proposed transfer station would “pose significant negative impacts to
the adjoining and nearby properties.” 91 However, the staff
recommended approval with mitigating conditions. 92
When its request for rehearing was considered, Epic introduced
additional evidence of its intent to relocate facilities and enhanced
procedures and safety controls to address the Commissioner’s objections
and the staff’s concerns about ethanol’s hazardous designation.
However, Epic could not guarantee the railcars used to transport
ethanol would comply with the new PHMSA hazardous liquid
regulations or that transfer would not happen at night. Epic also
apparently did not confirm the prior owners’ responsibility for the
previous spill or document prior actions of remediation thereafter.93
The Commissioner testified again that:
The [neighborhood opponents’] major concern and the reason we
don’t want [the PZ Commission] to approve anything else is we are
not sure of what’s out there, what’s in the ground. We are not sure
the level of contamination. We are not sure whether any remediation
has been done . . . .94

The Commissioner asked that the rehearing be deferred or denied
until the neighborhood received answers on its concerns. 95
Residents also expressed their opposition. The Commission received
a petition signed by “nearly 100 area residents” opposing the rezoning
application which “raised concerns about the flammable nature of the
ethanol,” devaluation of property due to the pipeline, “traffic and noise
issues, . . . the hazardous nature of ethanol, and concerns regarding the
potential for spills during the unloading process.” 96 But, they did not

89. Id. at 569 n.3, 574–75, 826 S.E.2d at 406 n.3, 408 (quoting 49 U.S.C.
§ 60101(a)(4)(B) (2019)) (emphasis omitted).
90. Id. at 575, 826 S.E.2d at 408.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 580, 826 S.E.2d at 411–12 (Brown, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 571, 577, 826 S.E.2d at 406, 410 (majority opinion).
94. Id. at 571, 826 S.E.2d at 406.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 574, 826 S.E.2d at 408.
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counter Epic’s expert analysis, except through lay, anecdotal
comments.97
The Commission denied Epic’s motion for rehearing, citing ethanol’s
status as a hazardous liquid.98 Epic appealed, and the superior court
reversed finding that the PZ Commission abused its discretion. 99 The
PZ Commission appealed to the court of appeals. 100
On appeal, the key issue was whether the opposing comments of the
Commissioner and individual opponents, along with the petition, which
raised concerns about ethanol safety, were sufficient to justify the PZ
Commission’s denial, particularly when compared to the expert analysis
presented by Epic and Staff’s recommendation of approval.101 The
majority of the court of appeals held that they were, finding the fears
expressed by the opponents were “specific” to the subject property and
Epic’s proposed use and raised “specific issues . . . about noise, traffic,
possible contamination, and the flammability and hazardous nature of
ethanol that were specific to this tract and conditional use
application.”102
The majority held that the opponents’ comments did not express
generalized fears as did opponents in Fulton County v. Bartenfeld103 to a
SUP for a landfill.104 There, opponents’ comments about diminishing
property values and “traffic problems” were insufficient to support
denial of the SUP because they constituted generalized concerns “not
specifically shown to exist under the facts of th[e] case.” 105 Stating only
general concerns, the opponents in Bartenfeld were unable to stop the
landfill.106
The majority opinion likened the opponents’ concerns to the “specific
concerns” raised in Jackson County v. Earth Resources, Inc.107 There,
the proposed landfill was inconsistent with the county’s comprehensive
plan, a real estate appraiser testified as to the negative effect on nearby
property values and the applicant’s “representations concerning the

97. Id.
98. Id. at 571, 826 S.E.2d at 406.
99. Id. at 571–72, 826 S.E.2d at 406–07.
100. Id. at 572, 826 S.E.2d at 407.
101. Id. at 572–73, 826 S.E.2d at 407.
102. Id. at 575–76, 826 S.E.2d at 409.
103. 257 Ga. 766, 363 S.E.2d 555.
104. Bartenfeld, 257 Ga. at 767, 363 S.E.2d at 557; Macon-Bibb Cty., 349 Ga. at 575–
76, 826 S.E.2d at 409.
105. Bartenfeld, 257 Ga. at 770–71, 363 S.E.2d at 559.
106. Id. at 770–71, 363 S.E.2d at 559–60.
107. 280 Ga. 389, 627 S.E.2d 569 (2006).

[19] ZONING AND LAND USE-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

380

MERCER LAW REVIEW

11/26/2019 11:29 AM

[Vol. 71

potential for groundwater contamination were rebutted.”108 This specific
factual evidence was sufficient to support denial. 109 The majority in
Macon-Bibb County cited Bartenfeld for the proposition that more than
expert opinion can “be presented to, and considered by” the governing
authority, and it admonished the superior court to not reweigh evidence
before the governing authority.110 The majority, applying the “any
evidence” standard to review quasi-judicial zoning decisions, found the
opponents’ evidence sufficient to support denial of Epic’s applications,
noting that neither the trial nor appellate court should reweigh the
“‘credibility of determinations of the factfinder.’” 111 However, the
majority did not determine whether the opponents’ “specific” concerns
were factually substantiated.112
Denial of a rezoning or SUP application solely based on public lay,
anecdotal comments and concerns is problematic. In Macon-Bibb
County, only three residents and a local politician spoke in opposition at
the first hearing.113 At some point, denial of rezoning based on an
evidentiary record, in which authoritative expert testimony is countered
with only lay, anecdotal comments will render the denial arbitrary and
capricious.
As Judge Brown stated in his dissent, “[t]o accept the majority’s
interpretation of ‘any evidence’ is to accept any modicum of speculative
fear or unsubstantiated and misplaced blame as reasonable cause to
deny an appropriate use of private property.”114 He noted that:
Following the majority’s line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that
specific, unsubstantiated fears somehow hold more weight than
general, unsubstantiated fears . . . . [Under Bartenfeld,] [r]egardless
of how narrowly the fear or issue is framed, if it still is ‘not

108. Id. at 391, 627 S.E.2d at 572.
109. Id.
110. Macon-Bibb Cty., 349 Ga. App. at 576, 826 S.E.2d at 409 (quoting Earth
Resources, 280 Ga. at 391, 627 S.E.2d at 571).
111. Id. at 572–73, 826 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting DeKalb Cty. v. Bull, 295 Ga. App. 551,
552, 672 S.E.2d 500, 501 (2009)). The Macon-Bibb County opinion does not attempt to
reconcile ZPL and the quasi-judicial “any evidence” standard, implicitly relying on the
majority in York.
112. The opponents in Earth Resources opposed a SUP for a landfill based on fears
regarding “truck traffic and other issues,” concerns similar in form and substance to those
in Bartenfeld. Earth Resources, 280 Ga. at 391, 627 S.E.2d at 571–72.
113. Macon-Bibb Cty., 349 Ga. App. at 570, 826 S.E.2d at 406.
114. Id. at 576, 826 S.E.2d at 409 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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specifically shown to exist under the facts of the case,’ it does not rise
to the level of any evidence.115

In other words, Judge Brown reasoned that a superior court under
the “any evidence” standard can determine whether there was sufficient
evidence such that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support said decision” without reweighing the credibility of evidence. 116
Unsubstantiated fears should be inadequate to a reasonable mind to
support a quasi-judicial decision. Judge Brown also criticized the
majority’s failure to note the substantive evidence supporting approval
of the SUP.117 Because of Judge Brown’s dissent, Macon-Bibb County is
also physical precedent only.
The relationship between the York and Macon-Bibb County opinions
causes similar concerns expressed about Hoechstetter. As noted, York
continued the transition of legislative local government zoning decisions
into quasi-judicial proceedings, subject to review by writ of certiorari
under the “any evidence” rule. The “any evidence” standard places a
greater burden on zoning applicants and opponents to develop an
evidentiary record sufficient to support the zoning decision. However,
the same court in Macon-Bibb County allowed neighborhood opponents
to defeat a SUP with nominally “specific” anecdotal and lay “comments”
that asserted concerns about the proposed development on a specific
property to support denial without factual substantiation. 118
Zoning ordinances (as required by ZPL) establish procedures and
standards to afford due process protections to the public in the local
governments’ regulation of property uses through the exercise of their
zoning power.119 However, with respect to property owners, “due process
guarantees [also] act as a check against the arbitrary and capricious
use of that police power,”120 and “[s]pecific, unsubstantiated fears”
provide an insufficient basis to deprive a property owner a desired,
constitutional use of their property.121 It is inconsistent for the court of
appeals in York to hold that a SUP is a quasi-judicial decision of the
local government because its resolution requires the application of
criteria to the determination of approval (subject to superior court
115. Id. at 578, 826 S.E.2d at 410 (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting Bartenfeld, 257 Ga.
at 771, 363 S.E.2d at 559) (emphasis omitted).
116. Id. at 576–77, 826 S.E.2d at 409 (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting Emory Univ.,
260 Ga. at 897, 401 S.E.2d at 694).
117. Id. at 577, 826 S.E.2d at 409 (Brown, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 570, 826 S.E.2d at 406 (majority opinion).
119. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-2 (2019).
120. Diversified Holdings, LLP, 302 Ga. at 611, 807 S.E.2d at 888.
121. Macon-Bibb Cty., 349 Ga. App. at 578, 826 S.E.2d at 410 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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review under an “any evidence” standard) and then in Macon-Bibb
County allow anecdotal and unsupported statements of concerns to
satisfy the “any evidence” standard of review and deny the property
owner their constitutional right to use their property.
E. Deference to the Zoning Administrator: Clayton County v. New Image
Towing & Recovery, Inc.
In yet another physical precedent only case, the court of appeals in
Clayton County v. New Image Towing & Recovery Inc.122 held that a
zoning administrator did not abuse her discretion when she required a
business license applicant to submit a site plan as part of an
application, even though the business license provisions of the County’s
general code did not require it. 123 Similarly, the court held that the
Clayton County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) did not abuse its
discretion in affirming the administrator’s decision.124
In Clayton County, New Image Towing and Recovery, Inc. (New
Image) applied for a business license for a towing and wrecker service, a
permitted use in the zoning district applicable to the subject property.
New Image did not change the physical characteristics of the premises,
only the use thereon. As part of its business license application process,
New Image met with a review committee (the committee) which
requested the submission of a site plan to facilitate review of the
application. The county code pertinent to business licenses did not
require the submission of a site plan as a condition of approval of a
business license.125
New Image refused to provide a site plan and requested a written
decision from the zoning administrator that the site plan was required
for its business license—which the zoning administrator provided. New

122. 830 S.E.2d 805, No. A19A0298, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 (Ga. Ct. App. July 2,
2019).
123. Id. at 811, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *14.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 807, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *1–2. Business licenses and zoning are
generally considered separate legal responsibilities. Cobb Cty. v. Peavy, 248 Ga. 870, 872,
286 S.E.2d 732, 734 (1982):
[A] business license is typically not a device to ensure compliance with [the]
zoning ordinances. Although the general aim of both zoning and licensing
regulations is the promotion of the general welfare, each is independent of the
other and seeks to accomplish its purpose by a different means. The fact that a
zoning ordinance permits a use in a particular district does not authorize the
use there without a license.
Id.

[19] ZONING AND LAND USE-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

ZONING AND LAND USE

11/26/2019 11:29 AM

383

Image appealed the zoning administrator’s decision to BZA, which
conducted a hearing thereon.126
At the BZA hearing, the zoning administrator asserted that a site
plan is required “so that the [review committee] can make informed
zoning decisions and consider potential environmental and safety
impacts of the proposed use” and to enable her department to determine
whether a proposed use is permitted under the zoning ordinance. 127
BZA upheld the zoning administrator’s decision to require a site plan as
a condition precedent to the issuance of a business license to New
Image.128 New Image appealed by writ of certiorari to the superior
court. The superior court reversed BZA’s decision, and Clayton County
appealed.129
Here again, a majority of the court of appeals overturned the
superior court.130 The majority purported to apply a de novo standard of
review, as required when interpreting questions of law in a certiorari
proceeding.131 But, implicit in the majority opinion is deference to the
zoning administrator’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance and her
authority thereunder. Writing for the majority, Judge Markle justified
the zoning administrator’s demand for a site plan based on Section 6.1
of the Zoning Ordinance (not the business license code), which states
that “[a]ll . . . land use changes . . . shall be subject to all Development
Standards and regulations for the applicable zoning district,” and
Section 6.2 that requires a property owner to comply with the
ordinance’s development standards, including parking standards, if a
“‘structure, parking area or other site feature . . . [is] enlarged, altered,
or expanded.’”132 The court determined that the term “altered” included
alterations in the use of a property.133 The majority reasoned that this
interpretation was consistent with the zoning ordinance parking
standards, which varied depending on the intensity of a use. 134
Applying the “any evidence” standard, there was evidence that New
Image’s proposed use varied from the prior lessee’s use. 135
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Clayton Cty., 830 S.E.2d at 807–08, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *2–3.
Id. at 810–11, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *12.
Id. at 808, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *4.
Id.
Id. at 811, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *14.
Id. at 808, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *6.
Id. at 809–10, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *8–9 (quoting CLAYTON COUNTY, GA.,
ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 6.1–6.2).
133. Id. at 810, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *9–10.
134. Id. at 810, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *10.
135. Id. at 810, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *10–11. Prior uses on the property
included a fencing company. Id.
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After finding textual justification for the zoning administrator’s
assertion that New Image must comply with the zoning ordinance’s
parking standards, the majority turned to the site plan requirement. 136
In the greatest show of deference, the court stated (in a footnote) that
the zoning “[a]dministrator adequately justified her rationale for
requiring a site plan under these circumstances throughout the
hearing.”137 The majority purportedly applied rules of statutory
construction to read the term “altered” in Section 6.2 in pari materia
with other sections of the zoning ordinance which explicitly required
submission of a site plan.138 Since the court accepted the zoning
administrator’s justification for requiring a site plan, she “did not abuse
her discretion in requiring [the business] to submit a site plan during
the business license application process, nor did the BZA abuse its
discretion in upholding that decision.”139
New Image argued that Arras v. Herrin140 controlled. In Arras, the
petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of an
alcohol license after the local governing authority denied the petitioners
application.141 While the petitioner satisfied all the objective factors
under the ordinance for issuance of a license, the application was
denied because the ordinance granted the governing authority “full and
sole authority, in its absolute discretion, to determine whether [to grant
the] license . . . .”142 The supreme court held that the governing
authority could not deny the license “by exercising the ‘absolute
discretion’ contained in” the ordinance.143 To do so violated due
process.144 Instead, the governing authority was required to employ
“ascertainable standards . . . by which an applicant can intelligently
seek to qualify for a license.”145
The majority in Clayton County distinguished Arras based on the
“posture” of the license applications because the petitioner’s license in
Arras was actually denied, whereas New Image’s business license
application was not.146 Also, the majority stated that “the development
136. Id. at 810, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *11.
137. Id. at 811 n.3, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *14 n.3.
138. Id. at 809–10, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *8–9.
139. Id. at 811, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *14.
140. 255 Ga. 11, 334 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
141. Arras, 255 Ga. at 11, 334 S.E.2d at 678.
142. Id. at 11–12, 334 S.E.2d at 678.
143. Id. (quoting Section 11-102(7) of the Camden County beer, wine and liquor
ordinance).
144. Id. at 12, 334 S.E.2d at 679.
145. Id. (quoting Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964)).
146. Clayton Cty., 830 S.E.2d at 811, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *13.
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standards that guide the business license application process are set
forth in Article 6, and those include the submission of site plans.” 147
However, Article 6 of the Clayton County Zoning Ordinance applied to
construction “Development Standards” while business license
regulations were part of Clayton County’s general Code of Ordinances
and not in the Zoning Ordinance appendix.148
Judge Coomer’s dissent pointed out the majority’s result-driven
opinion, stating: the majority “impermissibly expand[ed] the [meaning]
of the ordinance beyond its explicit terms,” violating canons of statutory
construction that demand that a plain and unambiguous ordinance be
interpreted according to its terms and any ambiguities be resolved in
favor of the free use of property. 149 He noted that the majority opinion
implicitly interprets the term “other site feature” used in Section 6.2 of
the Zoning Ordinance to mean “land use change” in Section 6.1—an
impermissible expansion of the text.150 Section 6.1 titled “Introduction”
did not define the terms or modify Section 6.2 titled “Expansion or
Modification of Existing Uses and Structures.” 151 Section 6.1 was simply
a jurisdictional statement preceding the Zoning Ordinance that did not
apply to business licenses, and Section 6.2 simply set the rule that if
existing “structures, parking area[s] or other [physical] site feature[s]”
are “enlarged, altered, or expanded,” then they must conform to the
requirements of the Article, similar to any nonconforming structure. 152
Because New Image did not “enlarge[], alter[], or expand” any
improvement on the property, it was not required to comply with the
Zoning Ordinance provision governing parking standards.153
Judge Coomer also found no textual justification for the zoning
administrator’s site plan requirement, noting that the text of the Zoning
Ordinance plainly provided for “specific, unambiguous requirements for
when site plans must be provided” none of which applied to a “request
for a business license.”154 Further, he found Clayton County’s refusal to
act on New Image’s business license application tantamount to its
denial. “Because New Image has complied with all necessary [textual]
requirements for obtaining a business license and is not required to
147. Id.
148. CLAYTON COUNTY, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 22, art. II; App. A, art. 6 (the
Zoning Ordinance).
149. Clayton Cty., 830 S.E.2d at 812, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *17 (Coomer, J.,
dissenting).
150. Id. (Coomer, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 812–13, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *17–19 (Coomer, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 812–13, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *16, *18–19 (Coomer, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 812–13, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *16, *20 (Coomer, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 813 n.1, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *20 n.1 (Coomer, J., dissenting).
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submit a site plan in this instance, the county must issue the business
license applied for.”155
Clayton County is a highwater mark for judicial deference to
decisions of zoning administrators, boards and local governments, as if
they are the equivalent of administrative agencies. The court accepted
the zoning administrator’s “explan[ation] that a site plan was necessary
to determine whether New Image’s proposed use was in compliance
with” the zoning ordinance and found that “explanation [to be] entirely
reasonable.”156 This is the same test in Georgia for deference to a state
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulations which
asks whether the interpretation “‘is plainly erroneous or inconsistent’
with the regulation . . . [meaning that a court must uphold] an agency
interpretation so long as it is reasonable.” 157
III. APPEALS OF ZONING CASES FROM SUPERIOR COURT
Two cases involving whether an appeal of a zoning case from
superior court is direct pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34158 or requires an
application pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 were decided during the
survey period: Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Elbert County (Sweet City
II)159 and Carson v. Brown.160 These cases built on cases decided during
the last survey period. Specifically, Schumacher v. City of Roswell,161
modified the rule established in Trend Development that “appeals in

155. Id. at 814 n.2, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *21 n.2 (Coomer, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 811, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 at *13–14 (majority opinion).
157. E.g., City of Guyton v. Barrow, 305 Ga. 799, 802, 828 S.E.2d 366, 369 (2019).
158. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (2019) allows direct appeals for cases in which certain equitable
remedies are sought in the superior court following denial of rezoning, such as a writ of
mandamus to compel issuance of permits required for the land use requested or injunctive
relief to prevent enforcement of the zoning ordinance against the requested use. O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-34(a)(7) (2019). Though O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(4) allows a direct appeal from the
“granting or refusing applications . . . for interlocutory or final injunctions” and O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-34(a)(7) allows a direct appeal from the “granting or refusing to grant mandamus,”
Trend Development Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425, 383 S.E.2d 123 (1989), still
required an application for appeal even if mandamus and injunctive relief were sought in
superior court. Id. at 426, 383 S.E.2d at 124. In support, the court in Trend Development
referenced O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), which requires an application for “[a]ppeals from
decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . state and local administrative
agencies, and lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings.” O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1)
(2019); Trend Dev. Corp., 259 Ga. at 426, 383 S.E.2d at 124. However, the decision to zone
property is a legislative decision, and the local government’s council or commission is not
acting as a “local administrative agency” when it denies a rezoning application.
159. 347 Ga. App. 311, 818 S.E.2d 93 (2018).
160. 348 Ga. App. 689, 824 S.E.2d 605 (2019).
161. 301 Ga. 635, 803 S.E.2d 66 (2017).
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zoning cases will henceforth require an application,”162 by holding that
a challenge to enactment of a new zoning ordinance is a legislative act
challenged by direct appeal, as opposed to an appeal of a parcel-specific
zoning decision which must proceed by application. 163 Additionally,
Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwanee, held that: “the present
appeal, which is from a superior court order affirming a local zoning
board’s decision that the zoning regulations applied to a particular piece
of property are not unlawful, is the type of individualized determination
that remains subject to the application procedure set out in O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(a)(1).”164 Problems with these holdings related to ZPL were
raised in last year’s survey.165
A. Facial Challenge v. Parcel-Specific Decision
In Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Elbert County, the court of appeals, at
the direction of the supreme court, reconsidered its prior dismissal of a
zoning-related appeal for failure to follow the discretionary appeal
process.166 There, Sweet City Landfill, LLC (Sweet City) initially sought
a declaratory ruling that it was not required to obtain a SUP for a
“waste disposal facility,” or landfill.167 The supreme court held that a
facial challenge to the zoning ordinance did not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies and remanded the case back to the trial court
to consider the facial challenge to the zoning ordinance. 168
After the case was remanded, the County amended and replaced the
challenged ordinance to provide factors for consideration of an
application for a SUP (instead of standards), in accordance with
O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5.169 With its ordinance amended, the county filed a
162. Trend Dev., 259 Ga. at 425, 383 S.E.2d at 123.
163. Schumacher, 301 Ga. at 639, 803 S.E.2d at 70.
164. Diversified Holdings, LLP, 302 Ga. at 605, 807 S.E.2d at 884.
165. Galloway & Jones, supra note 1, at 301. Two significant problems are apparent on
the face of Diversified Holdings. First, the City Council denied Diversified Holdings’
rezoning application. The City Council is the legislative body of the City, not an advisory
local zoning board and its zoning decision was a legislative act. Second, the Supreme
Court’s distinction (in Schumacher and Diversified Holdings) between different types of
zoning decisions ignores the plainly stated “zoning decisions” definitions in ZPL. Under
O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(c) (2019), the rezoning of a single parcel is a legislative zoning
decision, just like the adoption of a new zoning ordinance, and neither constitutes a
decision of an administrative agency. But, ZPL is not mentioned in either Schumacher or
Diversified Holdings.
166. Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 347 Ga. App. at 312, 818 S.E.2d at 95.
167. Id.
168. Elbert Cty. v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 297 Ga. 429, 432–34, 436, 774 S.E.2d
658, 662–63, 665 (2015).
169. Sweet City II, 347 Ga. App. at 313, 315–16, 818 S.E.2d at 96–97.
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motion to dismiss contending that Sweet City’s claims were moot. The
trial court granted the motion and Sweet City appealed.170
Reviewing Schumacher, the court held that the appeal was not a
“zoning case” and could be directly appealed.171 After the supreme court
remanded the case, only the facial constitutional challenge to the
county’s solid waste ordinance under the dormant Commerce Clause
remained. Since the enactment of a zoning ordinance is a legislative
act,172 the County’s failure to take action on the SUP was not a decision
of an administrative agency that required a discretionary appeal under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1).173 In Schumacher, the challenge was a purely
facial attack,174 while the challenge in Sweet City II originated with an
attempt to obtain a SUP which was later determined to not be
required.175 Sweet City’s challenge would have required a discretionary
appeal, but-for the county’s failure to act on the SUP application. As a
result, “no individualized determination about a particular property”
within the meaning Schumacher was made.176 Sweet City, therefore,
was not a “zoning case” and could proceed by direct appeal.177
In a footnote, the court addressed the requirement in Trend
Development that zoning decision appeals proceed by application as an
appeal from an administrative agency asking whether a local
government as “an elected body, [can] properly be labeled an
‘administrative agency’ under any circumstances . . . .”178 The court
noted that Schumacher resolved the issue by “focus[ing] on the function
being performed by the [local government] to determine if it was acting”
in an administrative, legislative, or quasi-judicial capacity.179 This
effectively requires a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the
appeal may proceed directly or only by application, creating confusion,
uncertainty, and risk for each appeal.
Further, the court held that Sweet City’s challenge was moot as a
result of the new ordinance.180 Mootness is a jurisdictional issue that
should be addressed before any substantive claims. Therefore, the trial

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 313, 818 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 315, 818 S.E.2d at 97.
See O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4).
Sweet City II, 347 Ga. App. at 315, 818 S.E.2d at 97.
Schumacher, 301 Ga. at 635, 803 S.E.2d at 67.
Sweet City II, 347 Ga. App. at 313, 818 S.E.2d at 95–96.
Id. at 315, 818 S.E.2d at 97.
Id.
Id. at 314 n.1, 818 S.E.2d at 97 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 317, 818 S.E.2d at 98–99.
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court did not err in addressing mootness first. 181 The court also upheld
the trial court’s refusal to analyze Sweet City’s vested rights claim
which required the county to deny a permit first. 182 Here, the county
took no action on the SUP application. Consequently, Schumacher
requires a final administrative decision, even if the underlying dispute
is a “zoning case.”183
B. Failure to Issue a Land Disturbance Permit is not a “Zoning Decision”
under Schumacher—Carson v. Brown
In Carson v. Brown, the court held that a mandamus action to force
issuance of a land disturbance permit (LDP) is not a zoning decision
under Schumacher.184 Forsyth County enacted a thirty-day moratorium
prohibiting certain types of residential developments. Thereafter, an
LDP applicant filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel
the Forsyth County Department of Planning and Community
Development (the Department) to issue the permit. 185
Generally, denial of a writ of mandamus is directly appealable. 186
But, an application for discretionary appeal is required if the
underlying subject matter involves a zoning case or review of an
administrative decision.187 The court in Carson cited State of Georgia v.
International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. 188 in which the
supreme court explained that:
[A] “decision”—as the term is used in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) with
reference to administrative agencies—is most naturally and
reasonably understood to refer to an administrative determination of
an adjudicative nature . . . . [However,] formal adjudicative
procedures [are not required] . . . [The Court has] consistently . . .
refused . . . to require applicants in cases concerning executive
determinations and those involving rulemaking or other
determinations of a legislative nature.189

181. Id. at 317–18, 818 S.E.2d at 99.
182. Id. at 318, 818 S.E.2d at 99.
183. Schumacher, 301 Ga. at 639, 803 S.E.2d at 70.
184. Carson, 348 Ga. App. at 697, 824 S.E.2d at 613.
185. Id. at 690, 824 S.E.2d at 608.
186. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(7).
187. Carson, 348 Ga. App. at 692, 824 S.E.2d at 609 (quoting Selke v. Carson, 295 Ga.
628, 629, 759 S.E.2d 853, 854 (2014)).
188. 299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016).
189. Carson, 348 Ga. App. at 694 & n.19, 824 S.E.2d at 610–11 & n.19 (quoting Int’l
Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 299 Ga. at 404, 799 S.E.2d at 465).
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For example, in Mid-Georgia Environmental Management Group v.
Meriwether County,190 a property owner properly filed a direct appeal
from the denial of a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel
the issuance of a zoning verification letter because it was not a “zoning
decision” under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35.191
In Carson, the department “releas[ed]” the LDP application “back to
[the applicant] because of the moratorium,” but still asked the applicant
to submit additional information. 192 The applicant complied with the
request and then inquired about the application’s status. The county
attorney responded, interpreting the “release” as a rejection of the
application.193 The court found that the “release” was not a rejection
and, thus, not a decision for the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1).194
Therefore, “the discretionary appeal procedure was not implicated,” and
a direct appeal was proper.195 Since no decision was made on the LDP
application, Carson did not have to exhaust administrative remedies
before seeking the writ of mandamus. 196
However, the court also held that Carson could not challenge the
constitutionality of the moratorium by a petition for writ of
mandamus.197 Instead, Carson should have filed “‘[a] declaratory
judgment action [which] is an especially and particularly appropriate
method of determining a controversy with respect to the
constitutionality of a[] . . . legislat[ive]’” act.198 Moreover, sovereign
immunity under Lathrop, bars a mandamus action against an official
acting in their official capacity.199 Because mandamus is a personal
action against an official, individually, sovereign immunity did not bar
the petition.200 Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the officials in
their individual capacities from the mandamus action.201
Given these new authorities, the proper procedure by which a
zoning-related case may be appealed remains in flux. When in doubt,
zoning practitioners are well-advised to return to the practice of filing
190. 277 Ga. 670, 594 S.E.2d 344 (2004).
191. Id. at 672, 594 S.E.2d at 347.
192. Carson, 348 Ga. App. at 694, 824 S.E.2d at 610.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 697, 824 S.E.2d at 612–13.
195. Id. at 697, 824 S.E.2d at 613.
196. Id. at 710, 824 S.E.2d at 621.
197. Id. at 705, 824 S.E.2d at 617–18.
198. Id. at 704, 824 S.E.2d at 617 (quoting Harper v. Burgess, 225 Ga. 420, 422, 169
S.E.2d 297, 299 (1969)).
199. Id. at 705, 824 S.E.2d at 618.
200. Id. at 706, 824 S.E.2d at 618–19.
201. Id. at 706, 824 S.E.2d at 619.
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both direct appeals and applications for discretionary appeal in all
zoning actions, as was done before Trend Development.
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